Foreword to Symposium on  Should the Family Be Represented as an Entity? : Reexamining the Family Values of Legal Ethics by Pearce, Russell G.
SYMPOSIUM: "SHOULD THE
FAMILY BE REPRESENTED AS
AN ENTITY?"
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Family Values of Legal Ethics
Russell G. Pearce*
This symposium on whether the family should be represented as
an entity marks another milestone in the development of legal ethics
as a field central to understanding the operation of law in our society,
and not merely as a set of dry, largely irrelevant rules.1 It does so by
acknowledging that ethical rules of lawyers who represent families have
very real consequences for those families. Building on earlier efforts
to address this topic,2 this symposium's authors confront what some
commentators have described as the individualist impulse of the ethics
codes3 and whether this impulse is beneficial or harmful to families.
In response to hypotheticals provided by the Seattle University Law
t This is the title the editors of the Seattle University Law Review selected for this
symposium.
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Stein Center for Ethics and Public Interest
Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. For a further discussion of this point, see Russell G. Pearce, The Union Lawyer's
Obligations to Bargaining Unit Members: A Case Study of the Interdependence of Legal Ethics and
Substantive Law, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1095, 1117-26 (1996).
2. See, e.g., Patricia M. Batt, Note, The Family Unit as Client: A Means to Address the
Ethical Dilemmas Confronting Elder Law Attorneys, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 319 (1992); Teresa
Stanton Collett, The Ethics of Intergenerational Representation, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453 (1994);
Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in
Representing Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253 (1994); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics
of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963 (1987). Leading casebooks have also considered
these questions. See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & RICHARD W. PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL
AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 427-34 (1997) (discussing excerpt from
Pearce, supra).
3. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 2, at 1277-79, 1296-1301; Shaffer, supra note 2, at 969-75.
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Review,' the articles take very different approaches to analyzing
whether the ethics codes are indeed elastic enough to encompass an
organic conception of the family or whether new ethics rules are
needed or appropriate.
I. FAMILY VALUES AND LEGAL ETHICS
The perceived tension between legal ethics and family representa-
tion has resulted in attacks on the legal ethics codes for being
antifamily and prompted proposals to change the ethics codes to allow
lawyers better to represent families as an entity.5
In 1987, Professor Thomas Shaffer condemned the approach of
the ethics codes to family representation.6 He asserted that in family
representation "the lawyer's employer is a family" 7 and that a family
is an "organic community. '  To the detriment of the family, the legal
ethics codes embody a "sad, corrupting, and untruthful" ethic of
"radical individualism,"9  which forces lawyers to focus on the
differences between individual family members and to neglect the
commonalities which are the foundation of the family.1 Shaffer
suggested that lawyers representing families adopt a "paternalistic
approach" based on "the virtues of good parents and the failures of bad
parents. ""
4. See hypotheticals infra Appendix.
5. A number of trust and estate practitioners have also sought to defuse this tension by
claiming that the legal ethics codes operate differently in the trust and estates area. See generally
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRUST AND ESTATE COUNSEL, COMMENTARIES ON MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1993); ABA Special Probate and Trust Division Study Committee
on Professional Responsibility: Comments and Recommendations on the Lawyer's Duties in
Representing Husband and Wife (approved by the Section on May 2, 1993); Malcolm A. Moore
& Anne K. Hilker, Representing Both Spouses: The New Section Recommendations, 7 PROB. &
PROP. 26 (July/Aug. 1993). Legal ethics scholars have observed that these efforts distort legal
ethics doctrine and offer contradictory policy goals. See Teresa Stanton Collett, And the Two Shall
Become as One... Until the Lawyers Are Done, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 101,
129-144 (criticizing proposal for separate simultaneous representation) (1993); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Conflict of Interest in Estate Planning for Husband and Wife, 20 PROB. L. 1, 4 (1994)
(noting that "the intimations that probate practice has a law unto itself come only from probate
practitioners themselves"); Pearce, supra note 2, at 1285-86 (asserting that these proposals diverge
significantly from established doctrine and that they "embody a contradictory vision of the family
which is both more and less communitarian than established doctrine").
6. Shaffer, supra note 2, at 963.
7. Id. at 970.
8. Id. at 970 n.26.
9. Id. at 970.
10. Id. at 969-75.
11. Id. at 987.
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My 1994 article on Family Values and Legal Ethics2 accepted
Shaffer's framework, but proposed a somewhat different understanding
of the problem and its solution. Recognizing the trend in law and in
society to treat the family more as a collection of individuals than a
community, 13 I noted that at present, legal ethics (similar to other
areas of law) treats families as both a collection of individuals and a
community.'" On one hand, the conflicts rules do permit family
members to consent to their joint representation by a single attor-
ney.'" On the other hand, even where they consent, the rules bar
such representation if the lawyer objectively determines that the
representation of any of them will be adversely affected by joint
representation. 16
This provision limits family representation in three ways. First,
it forbids lawyers from representing families in some circumstances
where they want such representation. Second, it describes families as
collections of separable individuals by expressly asking lawyers only to
identify differences between family members and not to promote
commonalities." Third, it gives lawyers the incentive to view family
members as a collection of individuals. The lawyer who errs in failing
to identify potential differences between family members faces
sanctions or disqualification, which are not a threat to the lawyer who
insists on representing only a separate individual."
To respect both the group and individual aspects of families, I
proposed Optional Family Representation.) Optional Family
Representation builds on the suggestions of Patricia Batt2" and
12. Pearce, supra note 2.
13. Id. at 1274-77.
14. Id. at 1274-79. For a more complete discussion of the shift from understanding the
family as a community to understanding it as a collection of individuals, see Janet L. Dolgin, The
Morality of Choice: Estate Planning and the Client Who Chooses Not to Choose, 22 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 31 (1998).
15. Pearce, supra note 2, at 1279. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.7(b) (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. For a more comprehensive analysis of established
legal ethics doctrine, see Pearce, supra note 2, at 1259-70.
16. See Pearce, supra note 2, at 1279. See MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.7(b).
17. Pearce, supra note 2, at 1278.
18. Pearce, supra note 2, at 1279. Cf. Shaffer, supra note 2, at 974 (noting that "[t]he safer
recourse, should fissures appear in the human harmony that first allowed the lawyer to be lawyer
for the group, is to stand back, let things fall apart, and then take professional refuge from the
falling debris by withdrawing from the representation."). For a discussion of possible sanctions,
including liability, see Steven H. Hobbs, Family Matters: Nonwaivable Conflicts of Interest in
Family Law, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 57 (1998).
19. Pearce, supra note 2, at 1294-1301 (explaining benefits of optional family representa-
tion).
20. Batt, supra note 2.
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Stephen Ellmann 21 that families are appropriate for representation as
groups similar to the entity representation provided under Rule
1.13.22 It permits lawyers to represent families who choose family
representation despite the existence of nonwaivable conflicts and
encourages lawyers to respect the harmonies of these families as well
as their differences. To implement these changes, I suggested
modifying existing rules to accommodate small groups, rather than to
create a rule specifically for families. 23  Families could choose
representation as a collection of individuals under the existing rules or
could choose family representation under the following conditions: (1)
they establish that a bona fide group identity exists and create
procedures for communicating information and making decisions;
24
(2) the lawyer must inform members of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of group representation at the initiation of representation and at
all times when new advantages and disadvantages arise;21 (3) they
agree that confidentiality will not exist within the group;26 and (4) for
purposes of withdrawal from representation, "the lawyer's representa-
tion should be deemed to apply to group members in their individual
capacity as well as their group affiliation.
27
Teresa Collett and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. have defended the
established doctrine against these proposals for family representation.
They argue that families are not legal entities, that family representa-
tion affords lawyers too much discretion, and that the established
doctrine is necessary to protect individual family members. 28  I have
responded to these critiques in a previous article.29
21. Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective
Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1115-18
(1992).
22. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.13.
23. Pearce, supra note 2, at 1313-14, n.414.
24. Id. at 1312-13.
25. Id. at 1313.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Teresa Stanton Collett, The Ethics of Intergenerational Representation, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1453, 184-1501 (1994); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Conflict of Interest in Estate Planning for
Husband and Wife, 20 THE PROB. LAWYER 1, 19-22 (1994).
29. Pearce, supra note 2, at 1301-12 (responding, inter alia, to arguments that "families lack
identifiable group characteristics necessary to legal representation," "family representation will
result in the lawyer substituting her judgment for that of the family," and "power imbalances
within the family make family representation inappropriate") (initial capitalization omitted).
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II. THE CONTINUING DEBATE: SHOULD THE FAMILY BE
REPRESENTED AS AN ENTITY?
The editors of the Seattle University Law Review decided to
expand the debate by creating this symposium on whether families
should be represented as entities. To sharpen the focus of the
submissions, the editors, with assistance from Teresa Collett and
myself, developed two hypotheticals.3" They asked the authors to
address both the general topic and the hypotheticals. The resulting
submissions take the debate on family representation to a new stage of
refinement and complexity.
A. The Hypotheticals
The hypotheticals present situations where the lawyer would either
have to deny representation or take a risk under established legal ethics
doctrine. In both, married couples consult an attorney for estate
planning and related advice under circumstances where significant
potential differences abound. In both, one member of the couple seeks
to delegate all decisions to the other. In the first hypothetical, a
wealthy and well-educated wife seeks to delegate all decisions to her
businessman husband because of her religious belief that wives should
be submissive to husbands." In the second, a construction supervisor
who plans to become a house husband seeks to delegate all decisions
to his physician wife.32
B. Reexamining the Family Values of Legal Ethics
The five articles in this symposium enhance the existing debate
and extend it into new areas. At the risk of oversimplifying these
unique and fascinating articles, I will try to describe briefly how they
fit within the context of scholarly consideration of family representation
and, in particular, how they compare with my proposal for Optional
Family Representation. Three of the articles offer important contribu-
tions within the current framework. They accept and-in two
instances-help explain the individualist basis of the legal ethics rules.
The two remaining articles mark a departure-one larger than the
other-from the existing scholarly debate in that they employ the
30. See infra Appendix.
31. Hypothetical I, app. at 14.
32. Hypothetical II, app. at 16.
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existing ethics rules to family representation in a largely communitarian
fashion.33
1. Modeling Established Doctrine
In The Power of Narrative: Listening to the Initial Client Inter-
view,34 Raven Lidman uses a dialogue between lawyer, husband, and
wife to provide a model of the approach of established legal ethics
doctrine. In the dialogue, the lawyer tells the spouses in Hypothetical
One that "I cannot represent you as a family."35 He explains that as
a matter of legal ethics and family law, "I don't write a family will, I
write a will for each person."
' 36
Within the context of established doctrine, Lidman explores the
dynamics between lawyer and client. Lidman's lawyer both informs
the clients of the law's individualist bias and offers to be sensitive to
the couple's preferences within that framework. He proposes to
"always try to be conscious of how your choices could affect your
children, when they come along, as well as others in your family. I
recognize that family ties are often our most significant relation-
ships. ' 37  Lidman suggests that the clients' response to the lawyer's
disclosures is uncertain. She offers two versions. In one, the clients
"wish it were simpler," but appreciate the lawyer's candor. 8 In the
other, the clients appreciate his candor, but feel "he was sort of
patronizing" and decide to consult another lawyer.
39
33. Until now, the participants in the existing debate have treated the legal ethics codes as
embodying an individualistic orientation and have disputed whether an individualistic or
communitarian orientation is preferable. See supra p. 3. However, in the context of bar
organization deliberations, arguments for a communitarian construction of the legal ethics codes
have been offered. For references to these arguments and critiques of these arguments, see supra
note 5. Apparently as a result of lobbying by bar groups, the American Law Institute modified
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers to permit lawyers greater flexibility in limiting
their obligations to individual family members in joint representation. See RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 Illustrations 2 & 3 & Comment L (proposed Final Draft
No. 1 March 29, 1996) (comment describes how the Council reversed its earlier position that
"disclosure to an affected, non-informed co-client was mandatory" in favor of the view of the
American College of Trusts and Estates Council); compare RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS (tent. Draft No. 4 1991) (emphasizing the potential for conflicts in
drafting reciprocal wills for spouses) with RESTATEMENT (March 29, 1996), supra, at § 211
Comment c, Illustrations 1 & 3 (emphasizing circumstances where consent is not necessary to
represent spouses in drafting wills).
34. 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 17 (1998).
35. Id. at 28.
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id. at 28.
38. Lidman, supra note 34, at 28.
39. Id. at 29.
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2. Significant New Contributions to the Current Framework
Two articles advance the current framework of debate through
theoretical and doctrinal development of established doctrine, but take
different approaches to the preferred representation of families.
In The Morality of Choice: Estate Planning and the Client Who
Chooses Not to Choose,4" Janet Dolgin offers what is probably the
most sophisticated account thus far of how the legal ethics rules for
representing families fit within the context of developments in family
law and family relationships. She traces "the transformation of
American families (and correspondingly of family and of estate law)
within the past half century."4  She explains how families and the
laws governing families have, in general, shifted from the notion of the
"family as a hierarchical social whole" to the family "as collections of
individuals, free to structure the scope of their association.... 42 As
Dolgin notes, though, "a new ideology and morality of domestic
relationships have not simply replaced older ones. Rather, a wide set
of options reflecting 'modern' and 'traditional' families are present at
once."' The result is "ambivalence and confusion.""'
In this context, Dolgin generally prefers the legal profession's
"morality of individualism"4 to Optional Family Representation.46
She acknowledges the benefits of Optional Family Representation for
the spouses in the two hypotheticals who present a clear understanding
of their relationship as a communal enterprise. For them, "[t]he
optional family approach harmonizes with the parties' own understand-
ings of their relationship, while offering some protection to the spouse
who chooses subservience. "''  But she concludes that Optional
40. 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 31 (1998).
41. Id. at 39.
42. Id. at 42.
43. Id. at 49.
44. Id.
45. Dolgin, supra note 40, at 54-55.
46. Dolgin ironically observes that strategies for providing families with choices between
individualist and communitarian "options" in the name of respecting communitarian families
(such as offered by Optional Family Representation discussed in text at notes 20-29 above or the
communitarian analyses of the existing legal ethics rules discussed in Part II.B.3. below) "are
products of modernity's obsession with choice." Id. at 39. Communitarian choices need not, of
course, serve the goal of returning to traditional understandings of the family. Where they do,
however, Dolgin insightfully notes that "[t]raditional domestic life, understood as chosen rather
than as an inevitable correlate of natural or supernatural truths, illustrates the allure of modernity
more firmly than it represents the preservation of a hallowed past." Id. at 40 (emphasis in
original).
47. Id. at 52.
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Family Representation asks too much of families. Most families are
uncertain about the contours of their relationship and, for all families,
the possibility of changes in understanding exist.48
Dolgin also suggests that Optional Family Representation asks too
much of lawyers. She recognizes that "Optional family representation
is more likely to encourage lawyers to be more aware and careful than
alternative approaches."49  It does so by "actively involv[ing] clients
in designing the terms of their own representation" and by requiring
"lawyers to acknowledge individual and communal concerns and to be
aware of areas of harmony as well as areas of disharmony between
spouses."" °  Dolgin suggests that these tasks may be beyond the
competence of most lawyers, who "will not be adequately attuned to
the communal interests at stake" or "identify consciously or less
consciously with one spouse or the other.""1  She also doubts that
lawyers will have the same facility in "'attending to both the group and
individual aspects of the family"' as psychologists.5 2 She suggests
that "even were lawyers able, without extensive training, to understand
family identities, the law itself limits the usefulness of that understand-
ing by failing--or perhaps refusing-to recognize communal rights."5"
While reaching a different conclusion, Stephen Hobbs similarly
makes a significant-but very different--contribution to our under-
standing of the individualist orientation of the legal ethics codes. In
Family Matters: Nonwaivable Conflicts of Interest in Family Law,
S4
Hobbs provides a comprehensive analysis of the cases and rules
regarding the nonwaivability of conflicts in family representation. He
then employs the principles underlying legal ethics doctrine s and the
insights of family systems theory 6 to explain and apply Optional
Family Representation to the families in the two hypotheticals.
Hobbs's thorough analysis demonstrates fairly conclusively that
the law and ethics of lawyering is largely, but not wholly, individualis-
tic in its approach to family representation. 7  While the rules
48. Id. at 52-53.
49. Id. at 55.
50. Id.
51. Dolgin, supra note 40, at 55.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 57 (1998).
55. Id. at 86-87 (particularly "two key factors, loyalty and zealousness").
56. Hobbs describes family systems theory at id. at 60-65.
57. This conclusion contrasts with Shaffer's observation that the legal ethics codes embody
"radical individualism," see supra note 9, and is consistent with my suggestion that the codes treat
families as both collections of individuals and a community. See supra note 14.
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themselves have individualistic implications,58 the cases and bar
opinions are actually quite mixed in how they construe the rules.5 9
Some decisions have a more individualist result, while others take a
more communitarian approach to the family.6" Nonetheless, as
discussed above, even this diversity of results favors an individualist
approach. The lawyer who abandons the ethic of individualism places
herself at risk.61
Hobbs moves beyond a description of the doctrine to propose a
method for analyzing nonwaivable conflicts. He starts with two
principles he derives from the doctrine-loyalty and zealous representa-
tion." He asks that lawyers represent both the individuals and the
family loyally and zealously.63 To achieve these goals, he employs
Optional Family Representation, which permits families to choose
representation as a family unit even where "individual interests may be
different or conflicting."64  In accepting such representation, the
"lawyer must conduct a self-assessment of the risks involved [and] ...
consider whether he or she can provide the requested services in a
manner that honors the family's concerns and honors the fundamental
principles of professionalism."65
In both hypotheticals, Hobbs urges representation despite the
potential conflicts and the actual risks to one of the spouses. He
suggests that loyalty to the family and the individuals requires the
lawyer to honor the choices they make.66 Zealousness requires the
lawyer to explain the advantages and disadvantages to the individuals
58. Hobbs, supra note 54, at 68, 79.
59. Id. at 65-89 (analyzing cases and bar opinions).
60. Some of these distinctions may result from the different tests courts use for determining
whether a conflict exists in the contexts of disqualification motions, criminal proceedings (both
in terms of representation and appeals based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel), and
disciplinary proceedings. Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 110-13 (1996) (arguing that conflicts standards may be different in the
disqualification versus disciplinary context); Bruce A. Green, Through a Glass, Darkly? How the
Courts See Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1211-22
(1989) (Supreme Court decision on disqualification in criminal case establishes standard
independent of disciplinary rules).
61. Hobbs describes the application of the rules to multiple client representation as
characterized by "softness and uncertainty." Hobbs, supra note 54, at 59 n.5. See supra note 18
and accompanying text.
62. Id. at 60.
63. Id. at 65.
64. Id. at 90. For a description of the elements of Optional Family Representation, see
supra text at notes 25-29.
65. Hobbs, supra note 54, at 90.
66. Id. at 91.
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and the family.67 Hobbs further advises "the lawyer to gauge the
family dynamics to determine if the requested services will be used to
pursue a common goal,"6 as well as whether the lawyer's tempera-
ment and ability permit her to undertake the representation.69
In the first hypothetical, Hobbs advises representation if the
husband shares his wife's religious values and the family operates
"under a jointly-held belief system, which then informs me how they
experience the world and make decisions."7 In the second hypotheti-
cal, Hobbs also advises respecting the family's choices, provided that
the lawyer makes full disclosure of individual options and investigates
the "history" and "dream[s]" of the family to ensure that the wife is
not using the representation to exploit the husband.71  In both
hypotheticals, the lawyer must "assess[] his or her ability" to provide
"appropriate[] and professional[]" representation72 in light of the
demand for "practice experience and family counseling skills" necessary
to manage "the conflicts inherent in providing legal services to multiple
family members."73
3. Communitarian Constructions of the Legal Ethics Codes
In contrast to the other authors in the symposium (and the
previous analysis of Tom Shaffer and myself),7 4 two articles offer a
communitarian construction of the legal ethics rules, which may be
anticipating new developments in established doctrine.7" These
articles differ both in their proposed guidelines for representing families
and in the justifications they offer for their preferred guidelines. This
Foreword will focus primarily on their proposed guidelines.
76
67. Id.
68. Id. at 92.
69. Id.
70. Hobbs, supra note 54, at 92-93.
71. Id. at 94.
72. Id. at 95.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 2. See also pp. 3-4.
75. For example, the organized efforts of trust and estates lawyers recently appear to have
succeeded in modifying the Restatement to reflect a more communitarian approach, at least to the
extent of recommending that lawyers have greater discretion to limit their obligations to individual
family members. See supra note 33.
76. The articles differ on whether it is appropriate to analogize delegations of authority from
one spouse to another to business delegations, Naomi Cahn & Robert Tuttle, Dependency and
Delegation: The Ethics of Marital Representation, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 106 (1998); Teresa
Stanton Collett, Love Among the Ruins: The Ethics of Counseling Happily Married Couples, 22
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 139, 158 (1998); and on the danger of subordination of women posed by
"traditional" family arrangements. Cahn & Tuttle, supra at 119-21; Collett, supra at 159-67.
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In Dependency and Delegation: The Ethics of Marital Representa-
tion,77 Naomi Cahn and Robert Tuttle offer the more communitarian
understanding of the legal ethics codes. They construe the legal ethics
codes to permit family members broadly to waive conflicts in order to
facilitate representation of the family which views itself as a unit.
This understanding apparently derives from their view that
"typically" the only nonwaivable conflicts under the legal ethics codes
"involv[e] simultaneous representation of adverse parties in litiga-
tion."78 In making this assertion, they take a position contrary to that
of established doctrine. As Stephen Hobbs observes, a sphere of
nonwaivable conflicts exists.79 Consent is not sufficient to waive a
conflict under the ethics rules which require that the lawyer objectively
determine that the parties will receive adequate representation.8 °
By adopting a more communitarian construction of the legal ethics
codes, Cahn and Tuttle are able to propose a broad delegation of
authority from one spouse to another under the current legal ethics
rules. They would allow initial consent to delegation to abrogate the
need for continuing informed consent for each client, except where the
delegated spouse takes "action[] that has potential to 'substantially
injure' the delegating spouse. '"81
This delegation is significantly broader than that permissible
under either established legal ethics doctrine or Optional Family
Representation. In addition to allowing representation where nonwaiv-
able conflicts exist, Cahn and Tuttle would limit required disclosures
after the initial consent to those regarding "substantial injury" to the
delegating spouse. In contrast, Rule 1.7(b) requires disclosure and
consent whenever the representation of the delegating spouse "may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities" to the delegated
spouse," a lower test than "substantial damage."
The Cahn-Tuttle approach also provides less protection to
individual family members than Optional Family Representation.
77. Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 76.
78. Id. at 100.
79. Hobbs, supra note 54, at 85.
80. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.7 (requiring in addition to consent that
the representation satisfy an objective requirement that "the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship" under Rule 1.7(a) and that "the representation will not be adversely
affected" under Rule 1.7(b)).
81. Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 76, at 126.
82. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.7(b). The Comment to Rule 1.7 makes clear that
Rule 1.7 applies to conflicts that "arise[] after representation has been undertaken." MODEL
RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.7 cmt. para. 2. See also CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS (1986).
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Although both proposals do permit families to consent to representa-
tion as a group, they differ in their requirement for continuing
consultation. Optional Family Representation requires communication
of all material information to all family members, including all new
advantages and disadvantages to Optional Family Representation
whenever they arise. 3
Despite the limited protection for individual family members
under their proposal, Cahn and Tuttle do acknowledge the risks which
representation of the family as a unit poses for its individual members.
Indeed, their discussion of dependency, vulnerability, autonomy and
manipulation within the family, and the potential risks to women in
representation of the family as a community, makes a significant
contribution to the literature. 4
Although her approach is similar to that of Cahn and Tuttle in its
advocacy of the communitarian potential of the legal ethics rules, 5
Teresa Collett's proposal in Love Among the Ruins: The Ethics of
Counseling Happily Married Couples, 6 is more consistent with
established doctrine. Without suggesting any change in the existing
rules, Collett urges lawyers to respect (and not to patronize) clients
who take a more communitarian approach to their family relation-
ships.8 7 In both hypotheticals, she eloquently argues for lawyers to
accept the delegation of authority from one spouse to another so long
as the delegation is consistent with the law 8 and "the lawyer's ability
to provide competent representation. 8 9
83. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
84. Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 76, at 111-21.
85. In her earlier work, Collett has championed a more individualistic approach to the ethics
rules and opposed communitarian proposals for family representation. See generally Collett,
Intergenerational Representation, supra note 2. See also Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 76, at 104
(citing Collett's opposition to communitarian forms of representation); Hobbs, supra note 54, at
62 (same). In her present article, she does not explain whether her current approach represents
a shift in her thinking or an elaboration. The relatively narrow communitarian scope of her
proposal suggests she may only be expanding the bounds of her analysis within the context of an
individualistic framework and not abandoning her earlier conclusions.
86. Collett, supra note 76.
87. Collett criticizes Cahn and Tuttle for advocating "paternalism." Id. at 164. Collett
explains the reasonableness of Ruth's request (in the first hypothetical) to delegate decisions to
Bob in light of her religious belief in "her duty of submission [and] her husband's duty of servant
leadership." Id. at 152. She explains how Joe's delegation (in the second hypothetical) "seems
premised upon a concept of 'burdens borne,' [under which] individuals who bear the greatest
burden of complying with a decision should have the greatest say in making the decision." Id.
at 169.
88. Id. at 164.
89. Collett, supra note 76, at 167.
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Collett's requirement of competent representation leads her closer
than Cahn and Tuttle to established doctrine. In her view, competent
representation requires full participation in the representation by both
spouses.9" Collett would therefore allow a spouse to delegate decision
making authority, but (unlike Cahn and Tuttle) would not permit
delegation of participation. With her insistence on mandatory
participation of all family members, her proposal comes much closer
than Cahn and Tuttle's proposal to Rule 1.7(b)'s requirement of
consultation whenever "representation of [a] client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client."
'91
As a proponent of Optional Family Representation, I find myself
quite sympathetic with Collett's approach. In its requirement both of
respect for the family's vision of itself and for continuing participation
of all family members, it shares the spirit-if not the entire sub-
stance-of Optional Family Representation.
CONCLUSION
The lively debate among the authors in the symposium suggests
at least three conclusions. First, efforts to provide families with a
communitarian form of representation may be gathering strength.
Three of the five articles favor offering the choice of some type of
communitarian representation. Second, the authors' disagreements
regarding the proper purposes and contours of family representation
reflect the uncertainty in society regarding both the nature of the
family and the role of legal ethics. Third, the authors' agreement that
the ethics of lawyers has very real implications for the families they
represent marks a shift in approach to legal ethics and offers the
promise of further advances in doctrinal and theoretical analysis.
While it is unclear how the debate over representation of the family as
an entity will eventually be resolved, what is clear is that through this
symposium, the Seattle University Law Review has provided distin-
guished authors with an important opportunity to assess the interaction
between legal ethics, the various laws regulating family relationships,
and families themselves.
90. Id. at 165.
91. MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.7(b).
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APPENDIX
HYPOTHETICAL I
Bob and Ruth need estate planning. They have been married
approximately two months. Bob is a successful sole proprietor and the
net worth of his assets is approximately two million dollars. This is
his first marriage. Ruth also has separate assets (commercial real
estate) valued at approximately five million dollars, which she inherited
at the death of her first husband. Neither Bob nor Ruth have any
children, although they hope to in the next year or two.
Ruth has a bachelor's degree in finance. She met her first
husband when she had just graduated from college and was working
as a loan officer at a bank. At the beginning of her first marriage,
Ruth decided to stay home and accompany her husband on his many
business trips. She has not been employed in years, nor does she plan
to be in the future. She intends to devote herself to "making a home
for our family, and being involved in local charities." She currently
chairs the land acquisition committee of the local Habitat for Humani-
ty affiliate, which acquires, on average, ten residential lots a year.
Bob has a bachelor's degree in computer science. He owns and
operates the local Internet access provider. The majority of his assets
are business related and owned free and clear. He is considering using
them as collateral to upgrade his server, and expand his market
geographically. He also plans to expand his service of creating and
maintaining web sites for his commercial customers. He expects this
part of his business to explode after the public becomes more confident
about transmitting credit card information via e-mail.
Neither Bob nor Ruth have a lawyer they consider as "their
lawyer." Bob has occasionally consulted with various attorneys on
business related matters, but has no sense that any one of them is "his
attorney." Ruth worked with her husband's first lawyer during the
probate, but has not had a need to talk with him since. Neither have
consulted the hypothetical lawyer or any member of the firm before.
During the initial interview, Ruth tells the lawyer that she believes
that Bob, as the head of the household, should be the one to make all
decisions ultimately. Responding to the lawyer's uncomfortable (or
sardonically amused) look, she explains that she hopes to be a wife like
the woman described in scripture (Proverbs 31:10-31). She is confident
that St. Paul was correct in his admonition "Wives be submissive to
your husbands, and husbands love your wives as Christ loves the
church." See Ephesians 6:22-32. She understands this passage to
require her to defer to Bob in all things, and Bob to be prepared to
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sacrifice himself, even to the point of death, for her. She considers this
an unequal bargain, which is ultimately in her favor.
Ruth indicates that she is willing to transfer assets to Bob for the
expansion of his business or if it seems desirable in order to save taxes.
She specifically states that the lawyer is both authorized and directed
to rely upon Bob's decisions, even in matters relating to the assets she
brought to the marriage.
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HYPOTHETICAL II
Joseph and Susan also need estate planning. This is the only
marriage for both, and they have been married approximately six years.
Joe and Susan married while Susan was serving her residency in neuro-
opthamology. Joe works as a construction supervisor. Susan has been
in private practice for three years, and is expecting their first child. Joe
plans to quit his job to stay home with the baby since Susan loves her
work, and makes 10 times what he does. At some point, Joe wants to
go back to college and finish his degree, but not until their family is
well established.
Susan's net value is approximately $750,000, including paid-up
insurance. Joe's is approximately $50,000, comprised of two rental
houses he bought before they were married.
Neither Joe nor Susan have consulted the hypothetical lawyer or
any member of the firm before. The couple have come to the lawyer
in order to have the lawyer review a request by the medical practice
group that all physicians have their spouses execute a release of any
claims to the practice, its assets, or its revenues. By its terms, the
release includes any claims that would arise from dissolution of the
physician's marriage, either by death or divorce. The release would
preclude claims based upon equitable division of property or alimony
in a divorce, as well as claims based upon the elective share or family
allowance.
During the initial interview, Joe indicates he has no objection to
executing the release if Susan wants him to. He believes that any
assets they have or will acquire are bound to be the product of Susan's
efforts, and ultimately she should make all decisions about their
financial affairs. He specifically states that the lawyer is both
authorized and directed to rely upon Susan's decisions, even in matters
relating only to Joe's assets. Cr. Stropnicky v. Nathanson, Docket No.
91 -BPA-0061, Mass. Comm. Against Discrimination (opinion rendered
February 25, 1997).
Can the lawyer accept either of these couples as clients? Can he
accept the spouse's directive to accept the directions of only one
spouse?
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